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Abstract 
We analyze a unique hand-collected international sample of 475corporate lawsuits involving 361 publicly-traded 
defendant firms headquartered in 16 developed countries to explore how country factors influence litigation 
risk, equity market value, lawsuit outcomes, and settlement costs. Unlike U.S.-focused studies, we do not find a 
significant relation between stock turnover, equity performance, and the probability of litigation. Defendant 
firms headquartered in civil law countries or countries with less efficient judiciary systems face lower litigation 
risk and costs as well as less share price decline at filing. Countries whose courts are less independent 
demonstrate a significant bias against foreign defendant firms. 
Keywords 
International corporate finance, Corporate litigation, International law 
1. Introduction 
Although various studies analyze the effect of U.S. corporate lawsuits on shareholder value (e.g., Bhagat et al., 
1994; Gande and Lewis, 2009) and extensive research examines the effect of litigation risk on corporate 
behaviors (e.g., Lowry and Shu, 2002; DuCharme et al., 2004; Arena and Julio, 2015), the law and finance 
literature lacks an empirical analysis of the international corporate litigation environment. In this study we 
address this omission by analyzing a unique hand-collected sample of global lawsuits to explore how national 
legal systems, practices, and courts influence the corporate legal experience during litigation. 
Our study advances the law and financial economics literature by exploring for the first time the financial 
implication of global litigation. As corporate globalization progresses to establish itself as a major driver of 
economic growth, cross-border lawsuits have become widespread along with their relevance to the financial 
health of multinational companies. Our study provides novel evidence regarding how different institutional and 
legal characteristics across countries affect the corporate litigation environment. Specifically, we explore the 
effect of firm characteristics and country legal practices on the likelihood of litigation, the types of lawsuits filed, 
the market reaction to lawsuit filings, litigation outcomes, and settlement costs. 
The dataset we use for our analysis consists of 482 corporate lawsuits filed between 1999 and 2008 against 361 
publicly-traded firms headquartered in 16 different developed countries. We terminate our sample in 2008 to 
allow sufficient time for the suits to resolve and allow us to analyze final outcomes. Unlike other studies of 
corporate lawsuits, our sample is not restricted to class action securities litigation, but consists of a variety of 
lawsuits including patent, antitrust, fraud and labor lawsuits. Thus, our study is the first to analyze the effect of 
litigation not only across a number of countries, but also for different lawsuit types. We develop seven different 
hypotheses to motivate our empirical work. These hypotheses focus around the triggers for litigation and the 
national determinants of litigation risk, the nature of the capital market’s response to a lawsuit filing, and the 
effect of court honesty and efficiency on litigation outcomes. 
We obtain a number of interesting and useful findings from our empirical analysis. Globally, security lawsuits are 
less common than in the U.S. due to the lack of a foreign analogue to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5. This SEC rule 
provides a right of action to investors against companies and directors for material misstatements that affect 
the secondary trading of securities. Foreign corporate law does not allow the initiation of class action lawsuits as 
easily as U.S. corporate law. When a lawsuit is initiated, the resulting settlement costs faced by defendant firms 
are also lower, providing less incentive to plaintiffs to initiate litigation (Armour et al., 2009). Unlike studies of 
U.S. lawsuits, we find that our international sample of lawsuits is not dominated by security class action lawsuits. 
Indeed, only 13.6% of our sample consists of these kinds of lawsuits. Further, we observe that equity 
underperformance for these foreign firms does not significantly increase the probability of a lawsuit. We also 
show that the announcement of a lawsuit filing against a non-U.S. firm effects its share price less negatively than 
it does for U.S. firms. 
Consistent with studies showing a different level of legal protection between civil law and common law 
system countries (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998), we find that differences in national institutional settings have a 
significant effect on litigation risk and the stock price reaction observed at the time of the lawsuit 
announcement. Specifically, we find that corporate litigation risk is lower for firms residing in civil law countries 
and countries with a less developed judiciary and legal system. The stock market reaction surrounding the 
announcement of a lawsuit filing is significantly more negative for defendant firms when the filing occurs in a 
common law country, in countries with a stronger rule of law, or countries with greater legal system integrity. 
Finally, we determine that the legal system and the judiciary quality of the country in which the lawsuit is filed 
have a significant effect on the lawsuit’s outcome. Everything else constant, defendant firms are more likely to 
lose their lawsuit or settle for higher amounts when the lawsuit is brought in countries with a common law 
heritage or a stronger rule of law. Further, we find that courts are more likely to rule against foreign defendant 
firms except in those countries where the judiciary has a tradition of independence and integrity. Bhattacharya 
et al. (2007) present evidence suggesting that U.S. firms have a home court advantage in U.S. federal courts. We 
find that this domestic bias in corporate lawsuits is a worldwide phenomenon, but can be mitigated by country-
specific court impartiality. 
We organize the remainder of this study as follows. Section 2 provides the development and discussion of our 
seven hypotheses which motivates our subsequent empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines our sample 
construction process and variable measurement. Section 4 provides summary statistics and an initial univariate 
analysis. Section 5 contains our examination of global litigation risk. Section 6 reports the results from our event 
study analysis while Section 7 describes our findings concerning litigation outcomes and costs. 
Section 8 presents a set of robustness tests while Section 9 concludes with a summary and a brief discussion. 
2. Hypotheses development and discussion 
U.S. federal civil procedure rules greatly facilitate the initiation of corporate lawsuits by various classes of 
stakeholders. Security class action lawsuits triggered by a decline in the stock price are extremely common in the 
U.S. and often result in significant settlement expenses for the defendant firm (Arena and Julio, 2015). Such 
lawsuits, however, occur less frequently outside the U.S (Armour et al., 2009). Buschkin (2005) notes that most 
foreign countries disapprove of the U.S. class action device as a way to punish firms. Indeed she explains that in 
many countries the legal system believes that governments, not private litigants, should regulate corporate 
conduct. Sherman (2002) claims that most other countries see the U.S. class action lawsuit as a “Pandora’s box 
that they want to avoid opening.” Thus, given the reluctance of other nations to encourage or even permit 
corporate class action lawsuits, a decline in share price should be less of a trigger for litigation outside the U.S. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1 
Stock underperformance and stock turnover do not significantly increase litigation risk for non-U.S. firms. 
Buschkin (2005) argues that the large size of the damages awarded to plaintiffs in U.S. class action lawsuits 
offends “foreign notions of public policy”. That is because most civil law countries believe that it is the role of 
the state to control corporate behavior. Lawsuits are seen as a mechanism to compensate victims for their 
losses, rather than punishing or deterring some corporate activity. U.S. law, and common law in general, 
believes that the threat of large civil damages resulting from lawsuits brought by private litigants can deter 
illegal or undesired activity. It can therefore serve as a substitute for public policy. Because of this fundamental 
difference in how class action litigation is viewed, we contend that firms are less likely to be sued in civil law 
countries. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 
Litigation risk is less for firms residing in civil law versus common law countries, everything else constant. 
Wallace (1998) describes how judicial corruption damages capital markets since it “increases the cost of running 
businesses, distorts public expenditures, and deters foreign investors.” It also compromises the ability of firms to 
contract since enforcement becomes problematic. This inability to contract is of special concern to investors and 
other suppliers of corporate capital who rely on contracting to protect their rights and ensure a rate of return 
(La Porta et al., 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003). Lawsuits filed in corrupt courts are unlikely to be successful 
because the judges are not impartial. 
If, however, the judiciary reflects high standards of ethical and professional behavior and practice, then firms 
can reasonably anticipate their contracts will be enforced. Judicial independence from political coercion makes it 
more likely for the rule of law to hold and for a stronger enforcement of corporate contracts. Further, there is 
likely to be a higher level of legal protection available to shareholders and other investors. Consequently, 
investors should anticipate greater success if they decide to file suit in such an environment. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3 
Litigation risk is greater for firms residing in countries with an independent and non-corrupt judiciary, everything 
else constant. 
The filing of a lawsuit is a negative event for a firm. If the suit is found to be meritorious, then the firm faces 
direct litigation costs in the form of a settlement or damage awards. Indirect costs, such as the opportunity cost 
of management’s time and reputational damage, are also significant for most lawsuits (Karpoff and Lott et al., 
1999). Bhagat et al. (1994); Bizjak and Coles (1995), and Bhagat et al. (1998) examine the wealth effects of inter-
firm lawsuits in the U.S. and discover that defendant firms experience a statistically significant negative price 
reaction at the time of the lawsuit filing. Gande and Lewis (2009) report significant negative stock price reactions 
to shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits in the U.S. Defendant firms outside the U.S. should also experience 
adverse movements in their share price upon announcement of a lawsuit filing because of the uncertainty 
regarding the size of the possible penalties. The reaction of these defendants, however, is likely to be less than 
that of their U.S. counterparts. This is due to more frequent judicial dismissals and smaller settlement amounts 
for lawsuits outside the U.S. as reported by West (2001) and Armour et al (2009). We hypothesize the following 
concerning the global reaction to the filing of a lawsuit: 
Hypothesis 4 
A defendant firm’s stock price significantly declines at the announcement of a lawsuit filing. 
Beck et al. (2003) explain how there is a difference between common and civil law regarding the importance 
they attach to private property rights relative to the rights of the state. They contend that common law has 
evolved to protect private property against the state and thus is associated with a robust set of shareholder 
rights. In contrast, civil law developed to consolidate state power. Mahoney (2001) contends that the judiciary 
focus of civil law has strengthened state institutions while limiting the rights of individual investors. 
Scholars such as Priest (1977), Rubin, 1977, Rubin, 1982, and Bailey and Rubin (1994) describe how civil law is 
less flexible than common law since judicial discretion is limited. Civil law requires changes to statutory law for it 
to respond to innovations in the economy or marketplace. Common law, however, emphasizes jurisprudence in 
the resolution of cases and hence is inherently more malleable to changing business conditions or 
circumstances. 
Because civil law offers less legal recourse to the private investor and civil law judges have less discretion in their 
decisions, firms in civil law countries face less risk of being found guilty when sued. This reduced likelihood of an 
adverse decision by a court will be reflected in the share price reaction at the announcement of a lawsuit filing 
in an efficient capital market (Karpoff et al., 2008a, Karpoff et al., 2008b). Thus we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5a 
Lawsuits filed in a civil law country are associated with a smaller announcement period stock price decline than 
those filed in common law countries. 
For similar reasons, we expect that lawsuits brought in civil law courts are more likely to be dismissed or settled 
for smaller amounts. Consequently, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5b 
Lawsuits filed in a civil law country are more likely to be dismissed or settled for a smaller amount than those 
filed in a common law country. 
When a lawsuit is filed in a country with a stronger rule of law, an independent judiciary, and honest judges, 
investors can be more confident that any lawsuit will be decided on its merits. In such environments, lawsuits 
are less likely to be dismissed due to political connections, bribery, or convenience. Thus, the defendant faces 
the full set of risks associated with an adverse decision. The capitalized value of these future expected penalties 
unmitigated by any partisan intervention from the judiciary will be captured in the equity market’s reaction to 
the filing announcement. Because the judiciary is able to assess the full range of possible penalties against the 
defendant when it is independent and free of corruption, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6 
Lawsuits filed in countries with a strong rule of law or a more honest judiciary are associated with a greater 
announcement period stock price decline, an increased likelihood of a resolution favorable to the plaintiff, and a 
larger settlement amount. 
There is an extensive literature in social psychology (Johnson, 1985; Stephan and Stephan, 1986; Kassin and 
Wrightsman, 1998) that documents a bias in jury decision-making. Moore (2003) observes that this can be 
explained by a similarity bias (McPherson et al., 2001), in-group bias (Terry and Callan, 1998; Scheepers et al., 
2006) or even ethnocentrism (Van der Dennen, 1987). The key observation in these explanations is that 
decision-makers favor individuals like themselves. Implied in these arguments is that these decision-makers 
discriminate against those who are different. Given the extensive psychology literature concerning affinity bias, 
it is reasonable to conjecture that courts of law have a negative bias against foreign defendant firms. 
The empirical examination of judicial bias, however, is quite limited and is confined to U.S. 
lawsuits. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) find that stock market returns observed upon filing of a lawsuit in the U.S. is 
more negative for foreign defendants. They also discover that U.S. firms are less likely to lose in court; however, 
they do not find a difference in settlement costs. We argue that a bias in judicial decision-making is not confined 
to the U.S. Indeed, we believe that it is likely to be stronger in countries whose courts are less impartial. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7 
Courts are biased against foreign corporate defendants. 
This bias is likely to manifest itself in more negative announcement returns at the filing of the lawsuit and larger 
settlement or damages awarded to the domestic plaintiff. We also speculate that this home bias occurs less in 
countries where the courts are more independent and less corrupt. 
3. Sample construction and variable measurement 
3.1. Data and sample design 
Our sample consists of observations hand-collected from news sources through word searches on Lexis-Nexis 
and Factiva. We restrict our sample to developed countries for which news coverage by English news sources is 
provided. We recognize that this places certain limitations on our sample, but any large lawsuit involving a 
publicly-traded company is likely to be captured by our collection procedure. Specifically, the sample includes 
lawsuits in which the defendant is a publicly-traded firm headquartered in Canada, Australia, Japan or any of 
the European Union countries. The sample consists of lawsuits filed between 1998 and 2008. Because some 
corporate lawsuits reach resolution only after several years from the filing date, setting the last year of the 
lawsuit announcement at 2008 allows us to collect data regarding resolution for most of our sample lawsuits. 
Our data on lawsuit resolutions is current through 2014. Our sample does not include lawsuits with defendant 
firms headquartered in the U.S. Our study intends to complement the vast literature which exclusively focuses 
on corporate litigation risk and costs for U.S. firms. We note, however, that even though we exclude U.S. 
companies, our sample does include cross-border lawsuits which are filed in U.S. courts against non-U.S. firms 
with operations in the United States. 
We obtain data concerning the lawsuit from two sources: news publication databanks and general internet 
sources. We collect news publication data through Factiva and LexisNexis. We select articles with keywords such 
as “firm”, “company”, “lawsuit”, and “litigation”. We read each article to determine whether it actually relates 
to corporate litigation. For those articles included in the dataset, we determine the earliest disclosure of their 
litigation through LexisNexis and general internet searches. We record the identity of the plaintiff and the 
defendant firm, the country of origin, as well as the jurisdiction of the lawsuit. We also record the nature of the 
lawsuit, describing the type of lawsuit that is being filed. Next we search both Factiva and LexisNexis to find 
announcements concerning resolution of these sample lawsuits. This is an observation-specific process since 
there are few keywords that can provide meaningful assistance. For lawsuits whose resolution remains 
unidentified in Factiva and Lexis-Nexis, we use an internet search engine approach to identify key words that are 
specific to the suit. For those lawsuits whose resolution still remains undetermined, we review official 
disclosures from the company, such as annual reports and shareholder letters. Finally, we identify which 
defendants are publicly traded through firm-specific research. We than manually match the publicly-traded 
defendant firm by firm name with the Worldscope and DataStream databases. After this data filtering, our final 
sample consists of 475 lawsuits spanning 361 unique firms headquartered in 16 different countries. Our sample 
is almost equally split between domestic lawsuits (55%) and cross-border lawsuits (45%). 
While we perform a thorough and careful data collection from our news sources, we recognize that litigation 
coverage might be more complete for some countries. For example, the coverage of litigation in non-Anglo-
Saxon countries might be less comprehensive due to incomplete reportage from English language media. This 
variation in coverage introduces unavoidable noise in the data which is common in cross-country empirical 
studies (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006). As argued by Henderson et al. (2006), the noise in the data, if anything, 
biases our tests against finding evidence of cross-sectional variations in our sample. Thus the findings of this 
study are not driven by the possibility of selection bias in the construction of our sample. 
3.2. Variable measurement 
Our empirical analysis is based on a set of firm-specific, country-specific, lawsuit-specific, and industry-specific 
variables. We describe these variables and their sources in detail in the Appendix A. The main empirical tests of 
this study consist of a probit analysis for the estimation of litigation risk and outcome, a Tobit analysis on the 
factors that affect litigation costs, and a set of event studies designed to identify the different effects of firm and 
national characteristics on the equity response to the announcement of a lawsuit filing. Our country-specific 
variables refer to the country where the firm is headquartered for the litigation risk analysis and to the country 
where the lawsuit is filed for the other multivariate tests. 
The firm-specific variables are firm size (log of the market value of equity, log of total assets), financial leverage, 
cumulative stock price returns in the year preceding the lawsuit, a indicator variable equal to one when the 
stock price drops more than 10% in any day in the past 12 months (stock dive), share turnover, the return on 
assets, cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) surrounding the lawsuit filing date, and the number of 
previous lawsuits filed against the firm. 
The country-specific variables includes a civil law dummy, a rule of law index, a judicial corruption index, an 
impartial courts index, an integrity of the legal system index, and a contract and law sub-index. Depending on 
the specific multivariate analysis, these country variables might refer to the country where the defendant firm is 
headquartered or the country where the lawsuit is filed. Additionally, we calculate a country-year litigation 
intensity variable as the number of corporate lawsuits filed against firms headquartered in the defendant 
country in the past three years. 
We also estimate a set of industry and lawsuit specific variables. The industry-specific variables consist of 
regulated, financial, and technology industry indicator variables. The lawsuit-specific variables are: (1) an 
indicator equal to one when the lawsuit is filed in a court of a country different from the defendant firm’s 
country, (2) an indicator variable equal to one if the lawsuit outcome is in favor of the plaintiffs, and (3) the 
dollar amount of the settlement or damages awarded. 
The stock price reaction at the time of the lawsuit filing is measured as the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) for the announcement day and the two days surrounding it (i.e., day −1 to day +1). We calculate 
abnormal returns around the announcement date by estimating the market model for each stock over the day 
−300 to day −46 window relative to the announcement date. 
4. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 reports the distribution of our sample lawsuits across a variety of case characteristics. Panel A shows the 
annual distribution of sample lawsuits. The number of lawsuits per year varies from a low of 28 in 2000 to a high 
of 61 in the years 2003, 2005, and 2006. The second half of our sample period (2004–2008) contains a larger 
number of lawsuits than the first half of the sample period, 280 out of 482 lawsuits (58%). This trend is 
analogous to the increase in the number of corporate lawsuits in the U.S. (Zingales, 2006). The most common 
case resolution, as shown in Panel B, is through settlement (49.7%) followed by rulings in favor of the defendant 
firm (16.7%) and then those resolved in favor of the plaintiffs (14.8%). Panel C shows that the costs borne by the 
defendant firms are substantial on average. When excluding dismissed lawsuits, firms pay an average of $175 
million in settlement or awarded damages. 
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics. This table presents various time-series and cross-sectional distributions of 
the sample. Panel A presents the distribution of lawsuits by the year of the lawsuit filing. Panel B segments the 
sample by resolution type. Panel C presents the mean and median of litigation costs. Panel D presents the 
distribution of lawsuit types. Panel E reports the frequency distribution of the number of years from the lawsuit 
filing to its resolution. 
Panel A: Year   
Year N Percentage 
1999 31 6.43 
2000 28 5.81 
2001 33 6.85 
2002 49 10.17 
2003 61 12.66 
2004 54 11.2 
2005 61 12.66 
2006 61 12.66 
2007 49 10.17 
2008 55 11.41 
Panel B: Resolution   
Resolution N Percentage 
Settlement 182 49.73 
Ruled for defendant 61 16.67 
Ruled for plaintiff 51 14.75 
Dismissed 45 12.30 
Withdrawn 17 4.64 
Other 7 1.91 
Ongoing or Unknown 116 
 
Panel C: Litigation Costs   
Resolution Mean Median 
Settlement or Damages 97.3 13.0 
Settlement of Damages (excluding (excluding dismissals) 175.2 47.0 
Settlement or Damages/Assets 0.13 0.02 
Settlement or Damages/Assets (excluding dismissals) 0.21 0.04 
Award requested 3959.9 100 
Settlement / Award requested 37.1% 7.4% 
Panel D: Lawsuit Type   
Type N Perc. 
Class Action 90 13.60 
Patent/Copyright/Trademark law 86 12.99 
Contract - Recovery / Enforcement 56 8.46 
Antitrust 55 8.31 
Securities Law 52 7.85 
Fraud 43 6.50 
Accounting, financial reporting 41 6.19 
Labor Law 34 5.14 
Mergers and Acquisitions 27 4.08 
Products Liability 24 3.63 
Directors and Officers Liability 23 3.47 
Injury 20 3.02 
Other 111 16.77 
Panel E: Years to Resolution   
Years N Perc. 
0 73 27.37 
1 53 19.34 
2 39 14.23 
3 44 16.06 
4 24 8.76 
5 17 6.20 
6 10 3.65 
7 4 1.46 
>7 10 6.65 
N/A 208 
 
This corresponds to nearly 21% of the value of the firm’s total assets. The median value of settlement amounts 
is smaller, due to a few lawsuits that resolve through very large settlements.1 
The type of lawsuit varies widely as shown in Panel D. We observe that class actions and patent lawsuits are 
relatively more common than other types of lawsuits. The percentage of class action lawsuits (13.6%), however, 
is considerably lower than for U.S. lawsuits involving domestic firms. Based on data from Audit 
Analytics Litigation over our sample period, about 30% of all U.S. corporate lawsuits are class action lawsuits. 
Panel E shows the time from the date of the lawsuit filing and its resolution that for lawsuits concluded by the 
end of 2014. For more than half of the lawsuits in our sample it takes at least two years to reach resolution. 
About 27% of the lawsuits take four years or longer to come to conclusion. The considerable length of the 
litigation process at the international level that is evidenced in Panel E is similar to considerable delay to reach 
settlements in US courts (Sullivan, 2016). 
Table 2 presents the distribution of lawsuits in our sample by the country where the defendant firm 
is headquartered (Panel A) and by the country where the lawsuit is filed (Panel B). We observe in Panel A that 
Canada has the most defendant firms in our sample with 33.8% of the observations. In aggregate, European 
firms make up approximately 40% of the sample. Despite our exclusion of U.S. firms, panel B shows that the 
majority of lawsuits are filed in U.S. courts.2 Only about 28% of the lawsuits in our sample are filed in European 
courts. 
Table 2. Lawsuit Distribution by Country. This table presents the distribution of sample lawsuits across countries. 
Panel A partitions the sample lawsuits by the country where the defendant firm is headquartered. Panel B 
divides the sample by the country where the lawsuit is filed. Panel C presents a country matrix of firm 
headquarters and the country of filing. 
Panel A: Headquarter Country   
Country N Perc. 
Canada 163 33.82 
Japan 105 21.78 
Australia 65 13.49 
Germany 44 9.13 
UK 42 8.71 
France 15 3.11 
Italy 10 2.07 
Netherlands 8 1.66 
Other European 30 6.23 
Panel B: Country of Filing   
Country N Perc. 
United States 160 33.68 
Canada 100 21.05 
Australia 44 9.26 
Germany 41 8.63 
Japan 38 8.00 
UK 28 5.89 
Italy 10 2.11 
Netherlands 10 2.11 
France 8 1.68 
Spain 8 1.68 
Other European 20 4.22 
Other 4 0.84 











          
 
Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherl. UK United 
States 
Other Total 
Australia 43 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 3 64 
Canada 0 97 0 0 0 0 0 2 60 0 159 
France 0 0 5 3 0 0 1 2 3 1 15 
Germany 0 0 1 33 1 0 0 2 2 5 44 
Italy 0 0 1 1 7 0 0 0 0 1 10 
Japan 0 1 0 0 0 38 0 2 58 4 103 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 1 0 8 
UK 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 12 20 5 42 
Other 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 6 2 17 30 
Total 44 100 8 41 10 38 10 28 160 36 475 
 
Panel C presents a matrix of lawsuits by defendant home country and the filing country. Unlike other firms, 
Japanese and British firms are sued more frequently in the U.S. than at home. We observe that Canadian firms 
have the most lawsuits filed in their country (97) as well as the largest number of lawsuits filed in the U.S. (60). 
Overall, our sample contains 215 cross-border lawsuits (45%) and 260 domestic lawsuits (55%). 
In Table 3 we investigate differences in litigation characteristics based on legal regime, litigation type, and the 
nature of the case resolution. Panel A of Table 3 shows that direct litigation costs (i.e., settlements or awarded 
damages) normalized by total assets are significantly larger for lawsuits filed in common law countries. For 
example, excluding dismissals, the mean litigation costs standardized by total assets for common law litigation is 
0.29. The corresponding value for civil law lawsuits is less than half with a value of 0.11. These results provide 
preliminary evidence consistent with Hypothesis 5b that settlements tend be smaller in civil law countries. We 
also observe that settlements and damages awarded to plaintiffs differ between domestic and foreign courts. 
When the monetary awards are standardized by total assets these differences lose their significance. This is 
likely due to the large size of the multinational firms that are sued in foreign courts. 
Table 3. Lawsuit Descriptive Statistics by Legal Regime. This table presents univariate statistics by legal system 
and court nationality. Panel A present t-tests of the mean and Wilcoxon parametric tests for litigation costs 
(settlement or damages awarded), and litigation costs normalized by total assets. Panel B present the 
distribution of lawsuits by lawsuit type for lawsuits brought in common law versus civil law countries and for 
lawsuits brought in domestic versus foreign courts. Panel C present the distribution of lawsuits by resolution 
type for lawsuits brought in common law versus civil law countries and for lawsuits brought in domestic versus 
foreign courts. 





 t-test Wilcoxon 
 
Mean Median Mean Median p-value p-value 
Settlement or Damages 127 9 65 7 0.1483 0.0351 
Settlement of Damages (excluding 
dismissals) 
200 62 142 27 0.1744 0.1319 
Settlement or Damages/Assets 0.232 0.002 0.081 0.000 0.0882 0.0119 
Settlement or Damages/Assets 
(excluding dismissals) 










Mean Median p-value p-value 
Settlement or Damages 52 6 148 19 0.0389 0.0596 
Settlement of Damages (excluding 
dismissals) 
89 25 261 50 0.0283 0.0000 
Settlement or Damages/Assets 0.167 0.001 0.151 0.002 0.9017 0.9019 
Settlement or Damages/Assets 
(excluding dismissals) 
0.213 0.005 0.187 0.004 0.8884 0.8874 
Panel B: Litigation type     
Type Common Law Civil Law Domestic Courts Foreign Courts 
Class Action 83 7 53 37  
17.89% 3.54% 14.89% 12.25% 
Patent/Copyright/Trademark law 50 36 27 59  
10.78% 18.18% 7.58% 19.53% 
Contract - Recovery / Enforcement 45 11 44 12  
9.70% 5.56% 12.36% 3.97% 
Antitrust 37 18 17 38  
7.97% 9.09% 4.78% 12.58% 
Securities Law 35 17 29 23  
7.54% 8.59% 8.15% 7.62% 
Fraud 31 12 25 18  
6.68% 6.06% 7.02% 5.96% 
Accounting, financial reporting 20 21 27 14  
4.31% 10.61% 7.58% 4.64% 
Labor Law 32 2 24 10  
6.90% 1.01% 6.74% 3.31% 
Mergers and Acquisitions 12 15 17 10  
2.59% 7.58% 4.78% 3.31% 
Products Liability 16 8 13 11  
3.45% 4.04% 3.65% 3.64% 
Directors and Officers Liability 17 6 14 9  
3.66% 3.03% 3.93% 2.98% 
Injury 13 7 7 13  
2.80% 3.54% 1.97% 4.3% 
Other 73 38 60 51  
15.73% 19.19% 16.85% 16.89% 




Panel C: Resolution type      
Common Law Civil Law Domestic Courts Foreign Courts 
Settlement 100 41 72 84 
 
54.35% 36.61% 46.15% 52.83% 
Ruled for Defendant 23 30 26 23  
12.50% 26.79% 16.17% 14.47% 
Ruled for Plaintiff 26 23 31 21  
14.13% 20.54% 19.87% 13.21% 
Dismissed 24 12 18 20  
13.04% 10.71% 11.54% 12.58% 
Withdrawn 9 5 6 8  
4.89% 4.46% 3.85% 5.03% 





Panel B of Table 3 shows the distribution of litigation type across legal regimes (civil vs common) and 
court nationality (domestic vs foreign). Class action lawsuits are the most frequent type of litigation in common 
law countries (17.9%) while lawsuits in civil law countries are more likely to be about patent infringement cases 
(18.2%). Only 3.54% of lawsuits filed in civil law countries are class action lawsuits. This is broadly consistent 
with the observation noted earlier by Buschkin (2005) that many countries believe that governments, not 
individual litigants, should regulate corporate behaviors. The Fisher exact test shows that the distribution of 
litigation type is significantly different between common and civil law countries. When contrasting lawsuits filed 
in domestic versus foreign courts, Panel B shows that class action lawsuits are more frequent for lawsuits 
brought in domestic courts. Patent infringement cases are the type of lawsuit most commonly filed in foreign 
courts. 
Panel C presents the distribution of lawsuit resolution across legal regimes. Even though settlement is the most 
likely outcome for lawsuits in both legal systems, it is more likely to occur for lawsuits brought in a common law 
country (54.4% versus 36.6%). A larger number of lawsuits are decided in favor of defendant firms in civil law 
than in common law countries (26.8% versus 12.5%). The Fisher test of homogeneity does not show a significant 
difference in the distribution of outcomes between lawsuits filed in domestic and foreign courts. Overall, the 
results presented in Table 3 present preliminary evidence of significant differences in corporate litigation costs, 
type of litigation filed, and case resolution between common and civil law countries. 
5. Predicted litigation risk 
We predict the probability of litigation for each firm-year by applying the method of Gande and Lewis 
(2009) and Kim and Skinner (2012). Specifically, we estimate the propensity to be sued by employing a probit 
model to generate the predicted probability of a firm being sued given various explanatory variables related to 
the size of potential damages in the case of a lawsuit, the litigation environment, and a set of firm-specific 
variables. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to one if a firm is sued in a given year and zero 
otherwise. All the explanatory variables refer to the year preceding the lawsuit. 
The sample for this probit estimation consists of our sample lawsuit observations matched with a set of 
Worldscope firm observations that are litigation free over the sample period. We align each of our sample firms 
with its match based on year, assets, and the market-to-book ratio. We do not match by industry and country 
because many of the determinants of litigation risk are measured at the country and industry levels. 
We estimate several proxies for the size of potential damage awards. These include share turnover, stock 
returns, and firm size. High share turnover captures the idea that investors are more likely to purchase shares 
based on incorrect or misleading information and is positively related to actual damage awards (Dyl, 
1999). Jones and Weingram (1996) find evidence that firms with relatively high stock returns are less likely to be 
sued. The market value of equity is included since large firms are more capable of paying large settlements and 
therefore are more subject to litigation. 
Comparable to Gande and Lewis (2009), we measure past litigation activity with an indicator variable equal to 
one in a given firm-year if a firm has been sued at least once in the previous five years. Since lawsuits tend to 
cluster in specific industries, we also follow Lowry and Shu (2002) and include a set of binary indicator variables 
to indicate whether a firm is classified as a regulated, financial, or technology firm. Firm-specific factors include 
the return on assets and financial leverage. These variables are meant to control for the firm’s overall 
performance since strongly performing firms are less likely to be sued (Bizjak and Coles, 1995; Bhagat et al., 
1998). 
Unique to this study, our probit model includes a civil law indicator variable which assumes the value of one if 
the defendant firm is headquartered in a civil law country. As per Hypothesis 2, we expect litigation risk to be 
lower in civil law countries due to the weaker legal protections granted to investors and less overall litigation 
activity (LaPorta et al., 1998). We also include a country-level litigation intensity variable and various proxies for 
the quality of the legal system in the country where the defendant firm is headquartered (i.e., rule of law, 
impartial courts, integrity of legal system, contract and law subindex). Because the country of the lawsuit is not 
known pre-litigation, the model cannot include the country specific variables related to the nation where the 
lawsuit might be filed. Even though lawsuits against multinational firms are sometimes filed in countries 
different from those where the firm is headquartered, about 60% of our lawsuits are filed in the headquartering 
country. The legal and judiciary systems of the country where the firm is headquartered provide a legal 
discipline to the firm that affects the incidence of litigation independent from the national institutions of the 
country where the lawsuit is filed. 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates of these probit estimation specifications. Similar to the findings 
of Gande and Lewis (2009), we find that the probability of being sued is positively and significantly related to the 
firm’s size and previous litigation history. While studies on U.S. corporate litigation do not find a significant 
relation between leverage and litigation risk (e.g. Arena and Julio, 2015), our results show that internationally 
firms with more debt in their capital structure are more likely to be sued. Unlike U.S.-centric litigation risk 
studies, we do not find a significant relation between stock turnover, cumulative returns, or an extreme stock 
price drop and the probability of being sued. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Table 4. Probit Estimation of the Propensity to be Sued. This table reports estimates from a probit estimation of 
the propensity to be sued. The dependent variable is an event indicator variable that equals one in the year a 
lawsuit is initiated against a firm and zero otherwise. The independent variables refer to the year preceding the 
lawsuit filing. The Appendix describes the independent variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The p-
values of statistically significant coefficients are reported in bold.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept −0.5925 −0.5154 −0.4580 −1.1703 −0.3037 −1.0215  
(0.0184) (0.0515) (0.0847) (0.0000) (0.5254) (0.2526) 
Ln MV 0.0363 0.0513 0.0746 0.0742 0.0811 0.0761  
(0.0931) (0.0740) (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0101) (0.0141) 
Leverage 0.3168 0.5058 0.4733 0.4738 0.3812 0.4802  
(0.0857) (0.0789) (0.0778) (0.0945) (0.0975) (0.0912) 
ROA −0.0952 −0.1026 −0.1841 −0.0816 −0.1539 −0.1792  
(0.5761) (0.5451) (0.3339) (0.6799) (0.4184) (0.3474) 
Turnover −12.5248 −13.2135 −27.4864 −3.0343 −15.9981 −26.7716  
(0.5163) (0.4964) (0.1816) (0.8856) (0.4622) (0.1937) 
Cumulative Returns −0.0611 −0.0537 −0.0387 −0.0458 −0.0445 −0.0398  
(0.3880) (0.4497) (0.5961) (0.5372) (0.5028) (0.5853) 
Stock Dive 0.2091 0.1553 0.0898 0.0723 0.1205 0.0880  
(0.1904) (0.1566) (0.5868) (0.6694) (0.4734) (0.5958) 
Previous Lawsuit 0.8978 0.8142 0.8139 0.6984 0.8112 0.8082  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Civil Law 
 
−0.4577 −0.5917 −0.3830 −0.2725 −0.5099   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0923) (0.0009) 
Litigation Intensity 
   
0.0652 
  
    
(0.0000) 
  
Rule of Law 
    
3.0460 
 




    
−0.9058 
 
     
(0.0000) 
 
Integrity of Legal System 
     
0.0808       
(0.0837) 
Contract and Law Subindex 
     




0.1135 0.1973 0.0943 0.1077    
(0.4950) (0.2451) (0.5738) (0.5181) 
Financial 
  
−0.5509 −0.4299 −0.5400 −0.5502    
(0.0000) (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Technology 
  
0.6558 0.6873 0.6305 0.6579    
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes No No No No 
Pseudo R2 0.216 0.253 0.309 0.342 0.351 0.329 
N 704 704 704 704 704 704 
 
The sign and coefficients of the financial and technology industry dummies are another noticeable difference 
between our results and those of U.S. centric studies. In our analysis, international financial firms are less likely 
to get sued than their U.S. counterparts. Technology firms, however, are more likely to be sued. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, we find that defendant firms headquartered in civil law countries face lower litigation risk. 
In the fourth model specification presented in Table 4, we include a litigation intensity variable that proxies for 
the corporate litigiousness of each country. It is calculated as the number of lawsuits filed against firms in each 
country over the previous three years. The coefficient of the litigation intensity variable is significantly positive, 
which shows the persistency of litigation. Models 5 and 6 further examine this issue by including country-level 
legal quality proxies. Among these proxies, the rule of law and the integrity of the legal system are significantly 
related to the probability of being sued. The significant coefficients for these judiciary and legal system variables 
are consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
In panel A of Table 5 we investigate the difference in litigation risk between legal systems. We accomplish this by 
averaging the predicted probabilities obtained from the coefficients of probit model (1) of Table 4, which does 
not include the civil law or rule of law variables as regressors. The mean (median) litigation risk for the sample 
and match companies headquartered in common law countries is 70.7% (73.1%). This is significantly higher than 
the corresponding mean (median) of 44.3% (40.6%) for firms headquartered in civil law countries. These results 
provide additional support for the validity of Hypothesis 2. 
Table 5. Relative Litigation Risk by Sample Country. This table presents the mean and median of the predicted 
probabilities obtained from the probit model (I) of Table 4 partitioned by legal system, rule of law, and 
defendant country. 
 
Litigation Risk   
Mean Median 
Panel A: Legal Regime   
Common Law 0.707 0.731 
Civil Law 0.443 0.406 





Panel B: Rule of Law   
Rule of Law, Bottom Quintile 0.457 0.404 
Rule of Law, Top Quintile 0.691 0.745 





Panel C: Defendant Country   
Canada 0.747 0.766 
Finland 0.685 0.709 
United Kingdom 0.679 0.668 
Ireland 0.670 0.660 
Australia 0.654 0.680 
Netherlands 0.514 0.468 
Japan 0.481 0.417 
Spain 0.426 0.433 
Sweden 0.423 0.408 
France 0.421 0.390 
Czech Republic 0.420 0.420 
Norway 0.390 0.426 
Germany 0.388 0.397 
Switzerland 0.387 0.380 
Italy 0.366 0.340 
Russia 0.352 0.400 
Poland 0.352 0.323 
Turkey 0.092 0.110 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, Panel B of Table 5 shows that firms headquartered in a country located in the top 
quintile of the rule of law measure have a significantly higher mean (median) predicted probability of litigation 
risk than firms in countries residing in the bottom quintile. 
Panel C of Table 5 presents the mean (median) litigation risk by the defendant firm’s country of incorporation in 
descending risk order. Canadian firms have the largest litigation risk. Four of the five countries with the highest 
level of litigation risk are common law countries: Australia, Ireland, Canada, and the U.K. It is important to note 
that these predicted probabilities do not provide an unconditional measure of a likelihood of litigation, but 
rather a relative one. For example, the mean predicted probability for Canadian firms (0.747) does not mean 
that a Canadian firm has, on average, a 74.7% probability to be sued next year. It means, instead, that Canadian 
firms are as twice likely to be sued as Italian firms, for which the predicted probability is 0.366. 
6. Event study analysis 
6.1. Comparative CAARs 
In this section we present the results of an event study of lawsuit announcements. There exists a rich literature 
concerning the stock market’s reaction to the filing of corporate lawsuits against U.S. firms (e.g., Karpoff and 
Lott et al., 1993; Bhagat et al., 1998; Gande and Lewis, 2009). Our event study, however, is the first to analyze 
the stock market’s reaction to the announcement of lawsuits involving non-U.S. firms. This analysis offers the 
literature a deeper insight into how other legal and judicial systems influence the capital market’s response to 
news of a lawsuit initiation. 
We calculate abnormal returns around the announcement date by estimating the market model over the day 
−300 to day −46 window relative to the announcement date. In our analysis, we focus on cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) for the three-day period centered on the announcement date (day −1 through day 
+1), the two–day period that starts at the announcement date (day 0 through day +1), and a five-day period 
spanning days −2 through day +2. Many lawsuits are partially anticipated by the market because they are 
preceded by events that increase the probability of litigation. Consequently, consistent with Gande and Lewis 
(2009) we also calculate CAARs for a longer event period which spans day −10 through day +2. 
Table 6 presents our univariate analysis for these CAARs. Panel A presents our findings for the full sample. The 
negative stock market reaction around the time of the lawsuit announcement is consistently significant 
regardless of event window length and the statistical method used for the z-statistic calculation. The longest 
event window (day −10 through day +2) is characterized by the most negative CAAR (−1.16%). This might be due 
to a partial anticipation of the lawsuit announcement. It could also be a response to media coverage of the 
events that trigger the lawsuit filing. While significant, the negative CAARs are smaller in magnitude than those 
reported in recent studies focusing on U.S. corporate lawsuits. For instance, Gande and Lewis (2009) find that 
the average CAAR for U.S. firms at the time of the filing of a security class action lawsuits against them is −1.55% 
for the three-day window centered around the announcement day (i.e., day −1 to day +1). This is much more 
negative than the −0.49% we observe for our international sample. They report a loss of 1.20% for the day −10 
to day +1 window, while we estimate a 1.16% decline for the slightly longer day −10 to day +2 window.3 The 
significant price decline for the defendant firm’ stock price at the announcement of a lawsuit filing is consistent 
with Hypothesis 4. 
Table 6. Comparative CAARS by Court Classifications. This table presents cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) centered on the lawsuit announcement date (day 0) over selected event windows. We calculate 
the CAARs by means of a market model with an estimation period of 253 days that terminates 46 days before 
the announcement. Panel A presents the filing date effect for all the lawsuits in the sample. Panel B and panel C 
show CAARs for defendant firms of lawsuits filed in common law and civil law countries, respectively. Panels D 
and E present CAARs for defendant firms of lawsuits filed in domestic and foreign courts, respectively. Z is the z 
statistics of the Patell (1976) test while SCS Z is the z statistics of the Boehmer et al. (1991) test.  
CAAR % Neg Z SCS Z 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 329)     
(0,1) −0.60% 60.95% −2.163 −1.987 
(-2,2) −0.51% 55.32% −1.987 −1.896 
(-1,1) −0.49% 59.93% −1.934 −2.060 
(-10,2) −1.16% 55.33% −2.535 −2.232 
Panel B: Common Law Courts (N = 165)     
(0,1) −0.81% 60.57% −1.441 −1.256 
(-2,2) −0.85% 56.12% −1.873 −1.776 
(-1,1) −0.77% 55.26% −1.888 −1.763 
(-10,2) −2.16% 54.99% −1.729 −1.454 
Panel C: Civil Law Courts (N = 164)     
(0,1) −0.27% 57.58% −1.421 −2.190 
(-2,2) −0.18% 52.12% −0.987 −1.323 
(-1,1) −0.02% 59.79% −0.349 −0.208 
(-10,2) −0.39% 50.01% −0.653 −1.172 
Panel D: Domestic Courts (N = 145)     
(0,1) −0.73% 62.07% −2.063 −2.011 
(-2,2) −0.72% 59.31% −2.448 −2.353 
(-1,1) −0.59% 62.16% −1.974 −1.982 
(-10,2) −1.04% 59.32% −2.057 −2.034 
Panel E: Foreign Courts (N = 184)     
(0,1) −0.56% 52.76% −1.798 −1.775 
(-2,2) −0.40% 60.82% −1.878 −1.956 
(-1,1) −0.42% 58.11% −1.724 −1.856 
(-10,2) −1.35% 52.70% −1.997 −1.934 
 
In panels B and C of Table 6 we present the CAARs for the common and civil law subsamples, respectively. The 
stock market reaction for a lawsuit filed in common law countries is more negative. This result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 5a that capital markets respond less negatively to litigation occurring in civil law countries. Firm 
shareholders and other stakeholders in general have less recourse to the courts in civil law countries. The lower 
likelihood of a large settlement or damage payments by the defendant firms in civil law countries (Table 3) is 
likely to explain the less negative CAARs observed for announcements of lawsuits in civil law countries. 
We next present the CAARs surrounding the announcement of a lawsuit in domestic (Panel D) and foreign (Panel 
E) courts. We find that the announcement returns for these defendant firms are of approximately equivalent 
magnitude and statistical significance, regardless of the court’s jurisdiction. These initial findings are inconsistent 
with the presence of a domestic bias against foreign defendants (Moore, 2003). 
6.2. Multivariate analysis of CAARs 
To better understand the cross-sectional nature of the CAARs surrounding the announcement of a lawsuit filing, 
we estimate a series of OLS regressions using the cumulative average abnormal returns calculated over the day 
−2 to day +2 window as the dependent variable. We provide the results of these regressions in Table 7.4 All 
specifications include year fixed effects. Among the firm-specific variables, only the logarithm of the firm’s 
equity market value and ROA are statistically significant. Larger firms are often the targets of lawsuits seeking 
high settlements. This might explain their more negative reaction to the lawsuit filing. Firms that are less 
profitable (i.e., lower returns on assets) experience a more negative stock return at the announcement of a 
lawsuit filing. Firms with reduced profitability have less cash available to settle or pay the awarded damages. 
Thus, they are more severely affected by the costs associated with a lawsuit. The civil law indicator variable is 
significantly positive. Firms headquartered in common law countries experience significantly more negative 
CAARs at the announcement of a lawsuit. This confirms the results presented in Table 6 and is consistent with 
Hypothesis 5. 
Table 7. Cross Sectional Regressions of Announcement Period CAARs. This table presents fixed 
effects regressions with the day −2 through day +2 CAARs as the dependent variable. The event date of the 
CAARs (day 0) is the day in which the lawsuit against the firm is filed. All specifications include year fixed effects. 
All independent variables are discussed in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The p-values of 
statistically significant coefficients are reported in bold.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.1191 0.1153 0.0827 0.1404 0.0116  
(0.0749) (0.0872) (0.4432) (0.3527) (0.9275) 
Ln MV −0.0101 −0.0106 −0.0070 −0.0085 −0.0068  
(0.0976) (0.0698) (0.1556) (0.0822) (0.1177) 
Leverage −0.0494 −0.0487 −0.0498 −0.0455 −0.0440  
(0.4530) (0.4598) (0.4697) (0.4996) (0.5247) 
ROA 0.2967 0.2940 0.2730 0.2886 0.2834 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0015) 
Turnover 1.3285 1.3844 3.2593 1.6364 2.0896  
(0.6909) (0.6791) (0.3279) (0.6332) (0.5500) 
Cumulative Returns −0.0126 −0.0127 −0.0147 −0.0160 −0.0160  
(0.4378) (0.4338) (0.3453) (0.3339) (0.3409) 
Previous Lawsuit 0.0496 0.0493 0.0405 0.0433 0.0396  
(0.0294) (0.0308) (0.0896) (0.0597) (0.0970) 
Litigation Intensity 0.0019 0.0019 0.0045 0.0049 0.0044  
(0.0953) (0.0986) (0.0807) (0.0651) (0.0662) 
Civil Law 0.0466 0.0448 
   
 
(0.0287) (0.0385) 

























Integrity Legal System 
   
−0.0240 
 
    
(0.0645) 
 
Contract and Law Subindex 
   
0.0334 
 





−0.2429 −0.0400 −0.0268 −0.1940   
(0.1583) (0.1205) (0.1728) (0.0476) 
Impartial x Foreign Court 
    
0.1246      
(0.0585) 
Regulated −0.0214 −0.0183 −0.0161 −0.0123 −0.0171  
(0.4626) (0.5390) (0.6066) (0.6875) (0.5898) 
Financial −0.0372 −0.0340 −0.0423 −0.0399 −0.0525  
(0.1875) (0.2401) (0.1514) (0.1701) (0.1368) 
Technology −0.0628 −0.0639 −0.0704 −0.0699 −0.0654  
(0.0190) (0.0170) (0.0109) (0.0117) (0.0213) 
Adj. R2 0.077 0.078 0.105 0.108 0.144 
N 337 337 337 337 337 
 
Firms that have been defendants in other lawsuits over the previous three years and firms sued in countries 
characterized by a greater litigation intensity experience less negative CAARs. These results offer new evidence 
about a litigation anticipation effect based on the litigiousness of the country where the lawsuit is filed. This 
occurs even after controlling for the firm’s litigation history. A lawsuit filed against a firm in a country with fewer 
corporate lawsuits is less likely to be anticipated by investors and thus generates more negative CAARs. 
While Gande and Lewis (2009) offer evidence of an anticipation effect for U.S. firms, our study shows an 
international version of this effect. 
In models (3) through (5) of Table 7 we include a set of country-level legal variables. In model (3) the coefficient 
for the rule of law variable is significantly negative. This suggests that investors anticipate corporate lawsuits in 
countries with a stronger rule of law to have a lower likelihood of dismissal which is consistent with Hypothesis 
6. Similarly, in model (4), the integrity of the legal system of the country in which the lawsuit is filed is 
significantly negative. A legal system characterized by higher levels of integrity is more likely to be insulated 
from corporate pressures or the lure of corruption, leading investors to anticipate larger settlement costs for 
defendant firms. This result is also consistent with Hypothesis 6. 
In model (5) we introduce an interaction term between the court impartiality index and the foreign court 
indicator variable. The foreign court indicator is significantly negative, while the interaction variable is 
significantly positive. These results support Hypothesis 7 and suggest that investors anticipate a bias against 
foreign companies. The positive coefficient for the interaction term, however, implies that this bias is reduced if 
the lawsuits are filed in courts having greater impartiality. 
7. Lawsuit outcome 
In this section we investigate the fir and country factors that affect the outcome of corporate lawsuits and 
settlement costs. To proceed with this examination, we group lawsuit resolutions into two groups: (1) those in 
favor of the defendant firm and, (2) those in favor of the plaintiff. We construct a lawsuit outcome variable that 
assumes the value of one if the case is settled by the defendant firm or ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and a value 
of zero if the suit is dismissed, withdrawn, or ruled in favor of the defendant firm. Table 8 presents the results of 
a probit regression using this litigation outcome indicator as the dependent variable. 
Table 8. Decision Probit Regressions. This table presents probit regressions with an indicator variable equal to 
one if the litigation outcome is against the defendant (rule for plaintiff or settlement) and zero if it is in favor of 
d the defendant (dismissal, withdrawal, or ruled for defendant) as dependent variable. All specifications include 
year fixed effects. All independent variables are discussed in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
The p-values of statistically significant coefficients are reported in bold.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.6030 0.6559 1.2637 −0.0143 0.1351  
(0.0860) (0.0654) (0.1059) (0.9896) (0.8902) 
Ln MV 0.0242 0.0342 0.0433 0.0293 0.0545  
(0.5583) (0.4209) (0.3257) (0.4938) (0.2236) 
Leverage −0.9120 −0.9565 −0.9026 −0.9655 −0.8288  
(0.0760) (0.0646) (0.0949) (0.0642) (0.1270) 
ROA −2.4698 −2.5418 −2.0086 −2.3527 −2.1174  
(0.0163) (0.0131) (0.0529) (0.0215) (0.0420) 
Turnover −19.0493 −20.4731 −38.0832 −31.525 −34.3642  
(0.5681) (0.5396) (0.2855) (0.3446) (0.3375) 
Cumulative Returns 0.1356 0.1378 0.1161 0.1513 0.1337  
(0.3574) (0.3480) (0.4064) (0.3159) (0.3942) 
Previous Lawsuit 0.0187 0.0138 0.0855 0.0792 0.0551  
(0.9160) (0.9379) (0.6525) (0.6501) (0.7743) 
Civil Law −0.3550 −0.4019 
   
 
(0.0490) (0.0339) 

























Integrity Legal System 
   
0.1420 
 
    
(0.1451) 
 
Contract and Law Subindex 
   
−0.1331 
 





0.1693 0.1474 0.1793 1.9005   
(0.3393) (0.5325) (0.6891) (0.0420) 
Impartial x Foreign Court 
    
−1.4423 
     
(0.0491) 
Regulated 0.0975 0.0554 0.0147 −0.0124 −0.0323  
(0.6915) (0.8246) (0.9569) (0.9601) (0.9068) 
Financial −0.1717 −0.2262 −0.3644 −0.2871 −0.4613  
(0.4669) (0.3519) (0.1682) (0.2435) (0.0901) 
Technology 0.3402 0.3377 0.2347 0.3157 0.2717  
(0.1384) (0.1411) (0.3278) (0.1750) (0.2593) 
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.101 0.231 0.106 0.268 
N 278 278 278 278 278 
 
The results show that two firm characteristics are important for explaining international litigation outcomes. 
First, we determine that leverage is consistently negative and statistically significant in four of our five model 
specifications. Firms with greater leverage must preserve their cash to service their debt and thus are more 
likely to mount an aggressive legal defense against expensive claims for settlement or damages. Second, firms 
that are more profitable are likely to attract higher rates of litigation simply because they have a greater 
capacity to pay. To the extent that many of these suits are frivolous or lack credible standing, they are more 
likely to be dismissed or withdrawn. 
Table 8 also presents evidence regarding the importance of country and firm factors in explaining lawsuit 
outcomes. As evidenced by the results in models (1) and (2) of Table 8, lawsuits filed in civil law courts are less 
likely to result in an outcome against the defendant firm. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 5b and the 
overall reduced level of corporate litigation risk in civil law jurisdictions. Models (3) and (4) introduce proxies for 
the judicial and legal quality of the country where the lawsuit is filed. Courts operating in countries with a 
stronger rule of law tend to favor stricter legal interpretations. Consequently, we find that their decisions are 
more likely to resolve against the defendant firm. In countries where the courts are more impartial, it is easier 
for private businesses to challenge government actions or regulation. Consequently, in these countries we find 
that the outcome more commonly favors the defendant firm. In model (5) we introduce an interaction between 
the impartial court index and the foreign court indicator variable. In this specification the impartial court index 
variable is statistically insignificant while the foreign court indicator is significantly positive. The interaction term 
has a statistically significant negative coefficient. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 7 and implies that 
courts might be biased against non-domestic defendant firms except in those countries whose courts are more 
impartial. 
In Table 9 we present the results from a set of Tobit regressions that analyze the effect of firm and country 
specific factors on the costs associated with damages or settlements awarded. We estimate Tobit regressions 
because we include dismissed and withdrawn cases, for which the settlement variable assume the value of zero. 
Similar to the results presented in Table 8, the coefficients for leverage and ROA are significantly negative. The 
coefficient for stock turnover is significantly positive across all model specifications. These results suggest that 
trading activity is more pronounced for lawsuits that resolve with large settlements. 
Table 9. Regression Analysis of Settlement Awards. This table presents Tobit regressions with the amount paid 
by the defendant firm to the plaintiffs (either settlement or awarded damages) as the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable is set to zero in case of dismissal, withdrawal, or ruling in favor of the defendant firm. All 
independent variables are discussed in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The p-values of 
statistically significant coefficients are reported in bold.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.2027 0.1472 0.2094 0.0775 0.1253  
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0307) (0.6394) (0.3172) 
Ln MV −0.0171 −0.0147 −0.0140 −0.0148 −0.0128 
 
(0.0013) (0.0082) (0.0135) (0.0104) (0.0263) 
Leverage −0.1957 −0.1947 −0.1877 −0.2014 −0.1855  
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0034) 
ROA −0.2175 −0.2106 −0.1786 −0.2115 −0.1787  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Turnover 10.9622 11.0287 11.4528 9.4280 11.9407  
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0228) (0.0051) 
Cumulative Returns 0.0078 0.0072 0.0081 0.0084 0.0081  
(0.4099) (0.4478) (0.3956) (0.3900) (0.3968) 
Previous Lawsuit 0.0195 0.0400 0.0186 0.0214 0.0167  
(0.3825) (0.5322) (0.4300) (0.3509) (0.4782) 
Civil Law −0.0705 −0.0581 
   
 
(0.0055) (0.0209) 

























Integrity Legal System 
   
0.0219 
 
    
(0.1900) 
 
Contract and Law Subindex 
   
−0.0270 
 





0.0130 0.0255 0.0187 0.1894   
(0.8951) (0.4232) (0.7550) (0.0467) 
Impartial x Foreign Court 
    
−0.1273      
(0.0341) 
Regulated −0.0329 −0.0256 −0.0246 −0.0384 −0.0298  
(0.2994) (0.2994) (0.4852) (0.2496) (0.4021) 
Financial −0.0509 −0.0475 −0.0531 −0.0550 −0.0645  
(0.0726) (0.1064) (0.0995) (0.0741) (0.0587) 
Technology −0.0151 −0.0104 −0.0045 −0.0104 −0.0047  
(0.6028) (0.7217) (0.8800) (0.7300) (0.8742) 
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.099 0.239 0.114 0.241 
N 278 278 278 278 278 
 
Except for the Bribery Judiciary variable, the significance of the country legal variables are comparable to those 
presented in Table 8. If the lawsuit is brought in a country with a stronger rule of law, the settlements and 
damages tend to be higher. This finding is consistent with our Hypothesis 6. In those countries where the courts 
are less impartial, we observe higher levels of settlement and damages being awarded when the defendant firm 
is foreign. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 7 and the presence of a bias against foreign defendant 
firms in these courts. 
8. Robustness tests 
Despite the exclusion of U.S. defendant firms from our sample, about one third of the sample lawsuits are 
litigated in U.S. courts (Panel B, Table 2). We verify that our results, and in particular, those for common law 
countries are not purely driven by these U.S. lawsuits by undertaking two further analyses. First, in unreported 
tests we replicate the multivariate regressions of Tables 4, 7, 8, and 9 by including a U.S. court indicator variable, 
which assumes the value of one if the litigation is filed in the U.S. and zero otherwise. This variable is not 
significant in any specification while the sign and significance of the other variables persist. Second, we replicate 
our event study and multivariate tests by excluding U.S. lawsuits from our sample. We observe in unreported 
tables that our results are also robust to this exclusion. Overall, these robustness test dispel any concern that 
U.S. lawsuit drive our findings. 
Many litigation studies focus solely on security class action lawsuits. While this choice is often motivated by data 
availability, it is also due to the popularity of this type of litigation in the U.S. As we have shown earlier, 
securities class action lawsuits are much less common outside the U.S. We test, however, for a possible class 
action effect in our results by including a security class action indicator variable in unreported regressions. The 
coefficient for this variable is statistically insignificant, while the other variables maintain their sign and 
significance. We obtain similar results when we re-estimate our tests and exclude security class action lawsuits 
from our sample. Overall, we conclude that our findings are not driven by security class litigation. 
9. Summary and discussion 
Although the corporate litigation environment has been extensively studied in both the finance and legal 
literatures, it has been undertaken only through the lens of the U.S. legal system. Yet, there are a number of 
factors which suggest that the patterns and practices observed in the U. S do not apply globally. Differences in 
legal codes and traditions (LaPorta et al., 1998), levels of efficiency and integrity in the legal and judicial 
systems (Langseth et al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2008) and even cultural attitudes towards the rule of law and 
authority (Almqvist, 2005; Licht et al., 2007) are likely to produce a divergence in corporate litigation 
experiences from U.S. practices. Our study address this omission in our understanding of business litigation by 
examining a unique hand-collected sample of 482 corporate lawsuits distributed over 16 developed countries. 
The findings from this study directly contribute to a deeper understanding of how litigation is experienced by 
firms internationally and might suggest legal strategies for both plaintiff and defendant firms with an 
international exposure. 
Our most important findings are focused around seven hypotheses which we develop to explain differences in 
the global corporate litigation experience. The first three hypotheses examine litigation triggers and what 
national factors influence litigation risk. We discover that unlike U.S. firms, stock underperformance 
and turnover do not significantly increase the risk of litigation. These litigation triggers appear to be exclusively a 
U.S. phenomenon. Consistent with the observations of other researchers on the nature of common and civil 
law (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Buschkin, 2005), we find that litigation risk is less for firms residing in civil law 
versus common law countries. Finally, we examine the role that judicial integrity and efficiency have upon the 
litigation experience of firms. We determine that litigation risk is greater for firms residing in countries with an 
independent and non-corrupt judiciary. This result is consistent with work in finance and developmental 
economics describing a linkage between a high integrity legal system, capital market development, and 
economic growth (La Porta et al., 1997). 
Our next set of hypotheses examine the capital market response to the announcement of a lawsuit filing. We 
find that there is a significant price decline throughout our sample when a lawsuit filing is announced. Although 
this result is not unexpected, the cross-sectional variability in the magnitude is a new result. While significant, 
the negative announcement period returns are smaller than those reported for firms in the U.S. Indeed, we find 
that capital markets respond less negatively to litigation occurring in civil law countries. This result might be 
explained by another of our findings that large damage awards or settlements are less likely in civil law 
countries. 
Our final set of hypotheses concerns the effect that court honesty and efficiency have on litigation outcomes. 
We find that lawsuits filed in countries with a strong rule of law or a more honest judiciary are associated with a 
deeper announcement period stock price decline, a higher likelihood of resolution in favor of the plaintiff, and a 
larger settlement. These results are also broadly consistent with work in institutional economics (Weingast, 
1995; Williamson, 2000; Rodrik et al., 2004) on the role of sound national institutions in fostering economic 
development. Finally, we discover that when courts are less independent or fail to be impartial, there is a bias 
against foreign defendants. The result of this bias is that foreign firms suffer higher settlement costs. 
Overall, this study presents novel evidence on the significant effect that country-specific institutional 
characteristics have on the corporate litigation experience. It confirms the importance of country-level factors in 
explaining corporate behaviors and practices. It also reinforces arguments that there are limits to globalization 
and that convergence in global business practices might be more constrained than generally believed (Coffee, 
1999; Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
Appendix A. Variable Definitions and Sources 
The legal country-level variables (i.e., Civil Law, Rule of Law, Impartial Courts, Integrity of Legal System, Contract 
and Law Subindex, Bribery Judiciary) refer to either the country of the defendant firm or the country of the 
lawsuit, depending on the regression. In the tables we distinguish them by attaching “- firm” or “-court” to the 
variable name, respectively. 
Variable Definition Source 
Assets Total assets of the firm expressed in millions of 
dollars 
Worldscope 
Bribery Judiciary This indicator is based on responses to the following 
public opinion survey question from the 
Transparency International Global Corruption 
Barometer: In the past 12 months have you had 
contact with the legal system or judiciary, and if so, 
paid a bribe in any form to the institution in 
question? The indicator is the percentage of 
respondents who answered that they have paid a 
bribe. 
Transparency International 
Civil Law Indicator equal to one if the country has a civil law 
legal system. 
Factbook list of legal systems 
Contract and Law 
Subindex 
Index (from 1 to 7) constructed as an average of the 
responses to four questions from the World 
Economic Forum's Executive Opinions Survey. 1) Is 
the judiciary in your country independent from 
political influences of members of government, 
citizens or firms? 2) Are financial assets and wealth 
clearly delineated and well protected by law? 3) Is 
your government neutral among bidders when 
deciding among public contracts? 4) Does organized 
crime impose significant costs on business? An 
average of 94 Chief Executive Officers or top-level 
managers are polled in each country. 
World Economic Forum 
Cumulative Returns Cumulative stock returns for the year preceding the 
lawsuit filing. 
Datastream 
Financial Indicator equal to one if the defendant firm is a 
financial firm. 
Worldscope 
Foreign Court Indicator equal to one if the lawsuit is brought in a 
court of a different country than the defendant firm 
headquarters’ country. 
Factiva/Lexis-Nexis 
Impartial Courts Index (from 0 to 10) that measures if a trusted legal 
framework exists for private businesses to challenge 
the legality of government actions or regulation. 
The Fraser Institute 
Impartial × Foreign 
Court 




Integrity of Legal 
System 
Index (from 0 to 10) that captures the efficiency and 
integrity of the legal system, particularly as it 
pertains to the treatment of foreign firms. 
Political Risk Services 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. Worldscope 
Litigation Intensity Number of corporate lawsuits filed against firms 
headquartered in the defendant country in the past 
three years. 
Factiva/Lexis-Nexis 
Ln MV Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization 
expressed in millions of dollars 
Datastream 
Previous Lawsuit Indicator equal to one if the defendant firm was the 
defendant of another lawsuit in the previous three 
years. 
Factiva/Lexis-Nexis 
Regulated Indicator equal to one if the defendant firm is in a 
regulated industry. 
Worldscope 
ROA Operating profits divided by total assets. Worldscope 
Rule of Law Index (from −2.5 to 2.5) that considers perceptions 
of crime, the effectiveness of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contracts. The measure is 
constructed using data drawn from dozens of data 
sources produced by international organizations, 
risk-rating agencies, think-tanks, and private 
organizations. 
The World Bank 
Stock Dive Indicator variable equal to one if the stock price 
dropped more than 10% on at least one day in the 
past 12 months after controlling for the country 
market index, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
Technology Indicator equal to one if the defendant firm is a 
technology firm. 
Worldscope 
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1Our sample includes 13 lawsuits that concluded with settlements surpassing $1 billion. The largest settlement 
in our sample is $3 billion. It was paid by the U.K. firm GlaxoSmithKline to settle criminal charges for 
promoting its antidepressant drugs for unapproved uses and failing to report safety data about one of 
their diabetes medicines. 
2In our multivariate analysis we indirectly and incompletely control for U.S. courts through indicator variables 
representing civil vs common law and foreign courts. In unreported robustness tests we also include a 
U.S. court indicator variable. The results do not significantly differ from those presented in the tables. 
3Romano (1991) in the first comprehensive analysis of U.S. shareholder class action suits finds little evidence of 
significant price reactions at the initiation of lawsuits (i.e., −0.41%). Her study, however, covers a much 
earlier time period (1966–1987) and contains only 66 lawsuits. 
4We replicate this test with the days (−1, 0) and days (0, +1) event windows. The results are similar to those 
presented in Table 7. 
 
